Abstract -We prove the security of the BennettBrassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We estimate the key generation rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
I. Introduction
The security of quantum cryptography is founded on principles of fundamental physics, rather than assumptions about the resources available to a potential adversary. In the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [1] , two parties (Alice and Bob) establish a secret key about which the eavesdropper (Eve) cannot obtain a significant amount of information. Alice sends a key bit to Bob by preparing a qubit in one of two conjugate bases and Bob measures the qubit in one of the two bases; Eve, who does not know the basis chosen by Alice or by Bob, cannot collect information about the key without producing a detectable disturbance. This protocol, when suitably augmented by classical error correction and privacy amplification, is provably secure against any attack by Eve allowed by quantum mechanics [2] .
Though security can be proven without imposing any restriction on Eve's attack (other than the requirement that she has no a priori information about the basis used), it is necessary to place conditions on the performance of the source and detector employed in the protocol. A number of important security proofs exist for BB84. But none of these proofs apply when both the source and detector have small imperfections that depend on the basis used in the protocol, the case relevant to typical real-world implementations of quantum key distribution.
The simplest way to analyze the consequences of characterized imperfections is to absorb the defective performance of the equipment into the eavesdropper's attack. Primarily for this reason, we are led to consider the security of the BB84 protocol in a different framework than in previous security proofs: the flaws in the source and detector may depend on the bases chosen, and furthermore Eve may know these bases, but her power to exploit this knowledge is limited. We will prove security under an assumption that limits the basis dependence of Eve's attack. As conservative cryptologists we are obliged to assume that, within the prescribed limits, the performance of the equipment is controlled by Eve and maximally exploited by her to gain information about the shared key.
Our analysis follows the method of Shor and Preskill, who proved the security of BB84 by relating it to an entanglement purification protocol. Their argument exploited a symmetry between the two bases used in the protocol, whose consequence is that the entangled pairs to be purified have equal rates of bit errors and phase errors.
Our task is to extend the analysis to the case where the symmetry between the bases is broken because the adversary has information about the basis used. We show that, with imperfect devices, the bit-flip error rate is different from the phase error rate. Whereas the bit-flip error rate can be directly measured in an experiment, the phase error rate has to be deduced through theoretical modelings of the experimental set-up.
Our extended method has applications to many scenarios in which quantum key distribution is executed with imperfect devices. We estimate the key generation rate in some special cases: sources that emit phase randomized weak coherent states, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors. The details of our work can be found in [3] .
